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This essay assesses black literature as a medium for working out popu-
lar understandings of America’s Constitution and laws.  Starting in the 
1940s, Langston Hughes’s fictional character, Jesse B. Semple, began ap-
pearing in the prominent black newspaper, the Chicago Defender.  The fig-
ure affectionately known as “Simple” was undereducated, unsophisticated, 
and plain spoken—certainly to a fault according to prevailing standards of 
civility, race relations, and professional attainment.  But these very traits, 
along with a gritty experience under Jim Crow, made him not only a sympa-
thetic figure but also an armchair legal theorist.  In a series of barroom con-
versations, Simple ably critiqued the ongoing project of liberal legal exper-
imentation.  In fact, Simple had something to say on many matters of consti-
tutional law: the injustice and absurdity of racial violence and segregation, 
the agonizing pace of integration, the limitations of the nation’s civil rights 
laws, and the dwindling effectiveness of street protests.  Fiction became a 
two-way legal medium, teaching citizens about the U.S. Constitution, while 
giving them a way to puncture the lofty yet cramped official interpretations 
of the law.  Through arguments, stories, and dream sequences, the author 
proposed a conception of equality rooted in authenticity, charity, and oppor-
tunity, to counteract the vision of selective, formal equality emerging from 
the Supreme Court.  As an alternative, he recommended a transitional form 
of poetic justice to effectuate the ethical and material transformation neces-
sary to guarantee equal protection of the law. 
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Oh, if every Negro in America, big and small, great and not so 
great, would just take his clothes off and keep them off for the sake 
of civil rights, America would be forced to scrutinize our cause. 
—Jesse B. Semple1 
 
In November 1942, the American poet Langston Hughes began writing 
a weekly column in the Chicago Defender.2  The next year, he introduced a 
character named Jesse B. Semple, who rapidly became a vehicle for critiqu-
ing issues of interest to the black community.3  Semple was born in Virginia 
but relocated to Harlem, straddling the two worlds.4  One is still haunted by 
the legacy of slavery; the other is undergoing a black renaissance yet re-
mains a place where more subtle forms of inequality are woven into the 
fabric of everyday life.5  Over the years, the character affectionately nick-
named “Simple” for his unsophisticated views and unvarnished way of 
speaking the truth arguably became “the most famous character in black 
fiction” and Hughes’s “greatest contribution to American culture.”6  The 
character turned out to be so vividly rendered that fans would address mail 
to Simple rather than his creator.7  As Hughes’s column was syndicated, 
republished in the New York Post, and then collected in a series of books, 
more and more Americans gained insight into an intra-community discus-
sion over race relations, democratic justice, and legal developments.  Der-
  
 1. LANGSTON HUGHES, Pose-Outs, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM 107, 109 (1965) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) 
 2. ARNOLD RAMPERSAND, THE LIFE OF LANGSTON HUGHES 53 (2nd ed. 2002) 
 3. Id. at 61-87. 
 4. LANGSTON HUGHES, Feet Live Their Own Life, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND (1943); LANGSTON 
HUGHES, A Toast to Harlem, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND supra, at 31. 
 5. See generally HUGHES, supra note 4. 
 6. DONNA AKIBA SULLIVAN HARPER, NOT SO SIMPLE: THE SIMPLE STORIES BY LANGSTON 
HUGHES 3 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also RAMPERSAD, supra note 2, at 113; Julian 
C. Carey, Jesse B. Semple Revisited and Revised, 32 PHYLON 158 (1971); Melvin G. Williams, Langston 
Hughes’s Jesse B. Semple: A Black Walter Mitty, 10 NEGRO AM. LIT. FORUM 66 (1976). 
 7. There is even a student note in the Harvard Law Review attributed to “Jesse B. Semple” accord-
ing to citations.  See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2479, 2494 n.44 (1994); Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair Housing Act: The 
Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and the Master Narrative 
of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69, 127 n.273 (1995); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipo-
lar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 853, 865 n.53 (2006).  A closer inspection, however, reveals that the name of the note’s 
author is omitted according to the Harvard Law Review’s conventions and that the piece begins with a 
quote attributed to Jesse B. Semple.  See Note, Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title VII, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 749 (1991).  Scholars and student editors unaware that Semple is a fictional character 
must have listed him as the author.  
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rick Bell became so enamoured of Simple that he updated the character and 
used it as a fictional interlocutor in his own stories.8 
To laugh along with Simple, as Arthur Davis suggests, is to engage in a 
form of therapy over our own clichéd thinking on matters of race.9  But 
there is more: a rich account of law and politics shared through humor and 
good sense.  This essay explores how the character of Simple emerged as a 
crucial medium in the black community for working out popular under-
standings of the law.10  Through dialogue, satire, the occasional poetry, and 
even extended fantasy,11 the author conveys the depths and complexity of 
African American attitudes toward everything from the failure to end lynch-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts to mold an integrated society.12  By 
developing a sophisticated politics of irony, he does his part to promote 
democratic justice.  Simple takes on defenders of racial apartheid,13 as well 
as the tactics of civil rights protestors engaged in direct action.14  He won-
ders why it took so long for the government to fulfill what the plain text of 
the Constitution promised, muses about remedies that the Supreme Court 
stubbornly refused to consider,15 and expresses frustration at intergenera-
tional injustices yet to be acknowledged.16 
Careful exegesis of Simple’s stories can enrich our appreciation for how 
constitutional visions can be sustained or deconstructed beyond the walls of 
the courthouse.  At their best, extant theories of popular constitutionalism 
have encouraged researchers to look past the myth of judicial review and 
examine how actors shape the meaning of the Constitution outside of the 
  
 8. See DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992) [hereinafter FACES]; Der-
rick A. Bell, Jr., A Holiday for Dr. King: The Significance of Symbols in the Black Freedom Struggle, 17 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 433 (1984) [hereinafter A Holiday for Dr. King].  See generally CAROL E. 
HENDERSON, AMERICA AND THE BLACK BODY: IDENTITY POLITICS IN PRINT AND VISUAL CULTURE 38-
41 (2009).  In A Holiday for Dr. King, Bell tells of a story of an encounter with a cab driver named 
“Jesse B.,” supposedly named after Langston Hughes’s famous character.  In this encounter, Bell plays 
the straight man (as Boyd did in Hughes’s stories) as the cabbie drives him through the ghettos of Har-
lem on his way to the airport.  Bell’s second-generation Simple has a harder edge, telling him that the 
Emancipation Proclamation and other proclamations are nothing but “bogus freedom checks that [the 
Man] never intends to honor.”  Bell, supra, at 434-35.  He sees Martin Luther King Day as “the latest 
gimmick white folks have come up with to keep dumb blacks satisfied.”  Id. at 434.  His tone is “more 
strident,” he speaks “with deadly seriousness,” and lacks the sense of rueful humor and playfulness of 
the original Simple character.  Id. at 436.  In his book, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, Bell turns 
Simple into a spokesperson for a black homeland outside of the United States.  FACES, supra, at 29-30.  
To make the character align more closely with a critical race perspective, then, Bell renders Simple more 
despondent of liberalism and more open to racial sovereignty. 
 9. Arthur P. Davis, Jesse B. Semple: Negro American, 15 PHYLON 21, 21 (1954).  
 10. I have previously analyzed how Langston Hughes’s poetry develops a melancholy ethics on 
behalf of the democratic citizen.  See Robert L. Tsai, The Ethics of Melancholy Citizenship, 89 OR. L. 
REV. 557 (2010). 
 11. See Sam G. Riley, Langston Hughes’s Jesse B. Semple Columns as Literary Journalism, 10 AM. 
PERIODICALS 63, 71-75 (2000) (analyzing literary devices employed by Hughes in stories about Simple). 
 12. See generally, HUGHES, supra note 4. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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courts.17  Many have focused on the behavior of institutions, social move-
ments, and high officials, or they have tried to measure the extent to which 
judicial rulings are backed by public opinion.18  Yet despite enlarging the 
field of inquiry, non-judicial approaches to legal change have sometimes 
suffered from being overly formal, elite, or unidirectional.  Many approach-
es have been hampered not only by methods, but also by sources.  To accu-
rately discern how constitutional ideas permeate the population and are in 
turn reworked by average people, we must look beyond judicial rulings and 
official texts and toward popular writings, orations, and underground litera-
ture. 
Examining how black fiction manipulates legal ideas makes it possible 
to broaden the field of action in which legal ideology is developed, the 
range of potential constitutional actors who manipulate understandings of 
the law, and the types of texts that reinforce or subvert the law.  The exer-
cise helps us to see, in the domain of popular culture, how legal knowledge 
can be made accessible and relevant to the experience of ordinary people.  
One can learn how sustained criticism of constitutional visions emerge from 
below, in places far removed from the formal processes of law.  Such cul-
tural systems can be every bit as tenacious as the justice system in shaping 
public understandings of foundational texts.  In fact, alternative legal texts 
may play an even greater role for a community that has experienced signifi-
cant democratic injustices but lacks the ability to push and pull the levers of 
power. 
I.  THE WORKING MAN’S BAR OF JUSTICE 
For a theory of law to be truly popular, it must be understandable by the 
common man.  On that score, the Simple stories easily satisfy the criteria of 
accessibility and salience.  From the outset, Hughes positions his famous 
character as a man of the people.  Simple describes himself in humble 
terms, as “not that smart and far from high educated,” a “broom pusher.”19  
It is through his rich dialogue with others that he reveals himself as en-
gaged, ornery, demanding.  During the course of conversations with a narra-
tor later given the name “Boyd,” Simple works through conflicting reactions 
  
 17. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); 
GORDON SILVERSTEIN: LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 
(2009); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(1999); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007); Mark A. Graber, 
Popular Constitutionalism, Judicial Supremacy, and the Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates, 81 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 923 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
 18. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War 
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 19. LANGSTON HUGHES, Face and Race, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM 58, 59 (1957) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
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to a number of social issues of the day.20  He may drink and ramble his 
blues away but make no mistake: there is something significant going on.21  
By having their fictional encounters take place in a local watering hole, the 
author sets the stage by subverting the reader’s expectations.22  Unlike so 
many institutions that have let down African Americans (including the legal 
system), the bar is dependable.  “I can lean on this bar,” Simple asserts, “but 
I ain’t got another thing in the U.S.A. on which to lean.”23  A bar might not 
be the type of place where one would imagine serious discussion of political 
or legal issues to occur but that sort of endless democratic conversation is in 
fact what the author portrays.24  The drinking establishment is where the 
common man can be found after the end of a long workday, lending the 
talks a degree of informality, authenticity, and intimacy.  In the freewheel-
ing atmosphere of the tavern, beyond the peering eyes of the state, all men 
are truly equal.  
Matters that might be discussed with tight-lipped gravity in other set-
tings can be approached in this site of democracy with bawdy humor, out-
rage, profanities—the kind of reactions that might seem uncivil, ungrateful, 
uppity, or dangerous elsewhere.  Perhaps more cautious or diffident in polite 
society, Simple bravely “stakes [his] claim” to freedom on a nightly basis 
while he nurses a drink.25  Through Simple’s regular judgments on political 
and legal controversies, the local bar is transformed into the common man’s 
“bar of justice.”26  Buying a beer for a thirsty fellow waiting on his 
paycheck is appreciated as the ultimate act of kindness, a form of equality 
rooted in charity for all. 
In the company of friends and strangers, Simple develops a distinctive 
politics of irony.  Practitioners within the legal system—judges and lawyers, 
bureaucratic actors—typically cannot deploy sarcasm, irony, or humor in 
the course of their official duties.  Institutional expression must be authori-
tative, measured, instrumentally directed, and calibrated to the precise insti-
tutional roles expected of them.27  If legal actors were to conduct themselves 
otherwise, they would risk being misunderstood, ignored, or defied.  By 
contrast, popular legal discourse can be wide-open, profane, and even fan-
tastic to achieve any number of desired reactions: shock, sympathy, outrage, 
disgust, disappointment, action.  Martha Nussbaum explains that 
  
 20. Phyllis R. Klotman, Jesse B. Semple and the Narrative Art of Langston Hughes, 3 J. NARRATIVE 
TECH. 66 (1973) (analyzing skit technique employed by Hughes). 
 21. Phyllis R. Klotman, Langston Hughes’s Jess B. Semple and the Blues, 36 PHYLON 68 (1975). 
 22. Davis, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
 23. LANGSTON HUGHES, Something to Lean On, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4 at 176, 
178 (1943). 
 24. Id. 
 25. LANGSTON HUGHES, Color on the Brain, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 106, 
107. 
 26. “My place is at the bar,” Simple tells Boyd.  “Of Justice?”  Boyd asks.  “Justice don’t run no 
bar,” Simple responds.  LANGSTON HUGHES, Income Tax, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4, at 
119, 125 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007). 
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“[l]iterature is in league with the emotions.”28  And yet, to the extent that 
such a medium can harness the emotions to expose gaps between law and 
experience and stimulate a more searching debate over the purpose of the 
law, fiction can serve the ends of public rationality. 
In the hands of an adept author such as Langston Hughes, fiction ac-
quires a dual orientation towards the law.  It can promote popular ac-
ceptance of the rule of law, insofar as an artistic work takes certain legal 
texts or principles as authoritative.  In those moments, the work of art rein-
forces the goals of a normative community to reproduce itself and its values.  
At the same time, the Simple stories uncover the inner workings of the law 
as an “empire of force,” and foster an anti-establishment ethic to counteract 
a culture that sustains lawful violence against human beings.29  They do so 
by recovering the dignity of those who suffer legal violence, uncovering the 
extent of damage wrought by the law, and pointing out missed opportunities 
for democratic justice.30  For Hughes, this process must entail reimagining 
existing institutions, starting with the transformation of a private establish-
ment into the working man’s bar of justice.  
A. Simple as Legal Theorist 
If the bar has been re-imagined as a site of deliberation and resistance, it 
is also because the setting and characters model an ideal of legal plural-
ism.31  The defining characteristic of legal pluralism is the belief that the 
vitality, justness, and efficacy of the law can only be ensured through con-
test among differing understandings, commitments, and priorities.32  
Hughes’s stories offer an account of law, and the Constitution in particular, 
from “the bottom part” of the U.S.A.33  Simple’s legal perspectives are often 
contrasted with that of Boyd, his straight man, who represents a patriotic, 
middle class point of view.  The narrator is an upwardly mobile “colleged” 
black, whose interests align well with the integrationist model of law.34  
Boyd supports the liberal vision of equality as “colorblindness,” regularly 
  
 28. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 53 
(1995). 
 29. James Boyd White develops Simone Weil’s evocate phrasing beyond a condition that makes 
war possible, into a mindset that facilitates any legal coercion, implicating the “psychological, emotion-
al, and ideological.” JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 5 (2006).  
See also Desmond Manderson, Trust Us Justice: 24, Popular Culture, and the Law, in IMAGINING 
LEGALITY: WHERE LAW MEETS POPULAR CULTURE 27 (Austin Sarat ed., 2011) (describing popular 
culture as “a site of resistance” to the law). 
 30. See generally HUGHES, supra note 1. 
 31. See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 869 (1988); John Griffiths, 
What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 3 (1986). 
 32. See generally Merry, supra note 32. 
 33. HUGHES, supra note 19, at 59. 
 34. LANGSTON HUGHES, Concernment, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 146, 152.  In an 
interview, the author suggests that the two characters’ dialogue represents tensions within himself and 
his community: “The character of my Simple Minded Friend . . . is just myself talking to me.  Or else me 
talking to myself.” HARPER, supra note 6, at 58 (quoting Langston Hughes, Simple and Me, 6 PHYLON 
349, 349 (1945)). 
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giving voice to the aspirational dimension of American citizenship.35  By 
contrast, Simple is a proud “race man . . . Till the day I die—since I will be 
black until I am buried,” leading Boyd to accuse him of having “color pho-
bia,” being a “racial isolationist,” “nationalist,” and “black chauvinist.”36  
Simple retorts, “You got one thing right . . . I am black.”37 
Representing the liberal hope in enlightened progress, the narrator longs 
for the day that the past is not only conquered, but also forgotten.  Instead of 
dwelling on contemporary injustice, Boyd thinks only of the future, advis-
ing Simple to rise “above the struggle” and “ignor[e] the petty things of this 
world.”38  Beyond suggesting that they must let bygones be bygones, Boyd 
believes in the uniform application of law.39  His character captures the law-
abiding citizen who is generally risk-averse, quick to point out the foolish-
ness, dangers, or costs of Simple’s proposals for achieving democratic jus-
tice.  Ideally for Boyd, as for other proponents of legal liberalism, constitu-
tional change should occur in an orderly and incremental fashion, through 
the normal operation of the legal and political system.40  Even the smallest 
deviation from establishment expectations of how citizens ought to behave 
troubles Boyd. 
Simple’s wife, Joyce, also serves as a vivid counterpoint, showing how 
tensions in the black community over ideology and tactics must be negotiat-
ed even within the basic family unit.41  She is an “intellect,” interested in the 
arts, and constantly pushing Simple to attend book talks and organizational 
functions.42  While Joyce is involved in civic activities to help fellow blacks 
“take away their country ways and prepare them for big-city days,”43 Simple 
would prefer to remain a passive member of the NAACP, which has taken 
the lead in suing racists and organizing boycotts.44  Boyd uncritically vocal-
izes positions one might expect of individuals interested in getting along 
and getting ahead, whereas Joyce captures the up-by-one’s-bootstraps tradi-
tion in the black community, believing that moral uplift will render the law 
an increasingly unnecessary tool.45  Joyce constantly seeks to civilize Sim-
ple, reshaping him according to the norms of a black urban lifestyle.  For 
Simple, spending so much time in the bar is as much a rejection of this civic 
project as it is a preference for the informal, semi-anonymous companion-
ship found in a tavern. 
  
 35. See generally HUGHES, supra note 34. 
 36. HUGHES, supra note 25, at 106, 106–08. 
 37. Id. at 108. 
 38. Id. at 107. 
 39. Id. at 106–08. 
 40. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996); 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY (1992). 
 41. HUGHES, supra note 1. 
 42. LANGSTON HUGHES, Roots and Trees, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 46, 46. 
 43. Id. at 49. 
 44. Id. at 47. 
 45. LANGSTON HUGHES, Color Problems, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 23, 25. 
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Simple is an idea man; a theorist, not an activist.  Cousin Minnie, who 
is the agitator in the family, takes to the streets to demand, “Freedom 
now!”46  Eschewing traditional activism along with the project of inward 
regeneration, Simple’s bemused detachment allows him to function as an 
effective legal critic. By freeing himself from permanent associations other 
than his racial identity, he is at liberty to attack democratic injustice, official 
hypocrisy, and even black complacency.  His ironic detachment allows him 
to “get with the nitty-gritty, wise up and be witty”—virtues he finds desira-
ble in a citizen of urban democracy.47  He can, by turns, credibly lacerate 
white America’s institutions for failing to live up to ancient legal promises 
and poke fun at the priorities of black leaders. And more than merely un-
dermining official conceptions of law, he is well-situated to present alterna-
tive readings of the nation’s most important laws. 
There is irony in the fact that some of the people most knowledgeable 
about legal rights are those least able to enjoy them.  “The Constitution 
guarantees us equal rights,” Simple insists, demonstrating his facility with 
the nation’s fundamental principles and making a demand for legal satisfac-
tion.48 “[B]ut have I got ‘em?  No.  It’s fell down on me. . . . Just like it fell 
down on that poor Negro lynched last month.”49  He plays on the phrase 
“fall down” to bring the nation’s highest laws down to earth, where the op-
pressed can be found.  Whether there is even such a thing as law and order, 
much less equality of citizenship, turns on whether legal rules can offer 
basic safety and dignity for average Americans.  If there is a major discon-
nect between higher law and their lived experience, Simple’s ruminations 
propose to repair that rupture. 
Though Simple shares a common rage with black radicals, he differs 
from black nationalists who insist that the Constitution has no claim upon 
African Americans in the United States.  Simple sees the abstractions con-
tained in the nation’s liberation texts as valuable and universal ideals, even 
as he points out that the promises have been poorly kept:  
Now, the way I understand it . . . it’s been written down a long time 
ago that all men are borned equal and everybody is entitled to life 
and liberty while pursuing happiness.  It’s in the Constitution, also 
Declaration of Independence, so I do not see why it has to be re-
solved all over again.50 
Simple makes a twofold point: these particular legal principles are invi-
olable and it takes something more than speech to ensure compliance.  The 
  
 46. LANGSTON HUGHES, Wigs for Freedom, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 139, 142. 
 47. HUGHES, supra note 46, at 48. 
 48. LANGSTON HUGHES, The Law, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4, at 178. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 192.  On the rise of competing theories of interpretation that emerge from an early republi-
can consensus, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885 (1985). 
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enormous gap between lofty aspirations and legal action is captured in his 
mantra, “Resolving ain’t solving.”51 
B. Dreams of Self-Governance 
Simple’s unsettled state allows him to imagine ways black Americans 
can make a difference someday.  In a number of stories, Simple tells Boyd 
about a dream he recently had, and in these moments, the two ponder the 
possibilities for black empowerment.52  These dream sequences—always 
rendered from Simple’s point of view and uniformly fantastic—are full of 
legal import.  As Simple explains, “it dreams so good to imagine again in 
my sleep that I am the ruler of Dixie, me, colored and all my people, in 
charge of the state we Negroes helped to make so beautiful.”53  During 
sleep, one can keep alive the fragile dream of self-governance, even when 
the daytime is characterized by the despair of disempowerment.  After a 
hard day of work, the evenings can be filled with the festive sharing of 
democratic dreams.   
How might political power be used if African Americans one day 
gained political clout?  Rendering democratic justice would be at the top of 
the agenda.  In the vignette For President,54 Simple declares that he is con-
templating a run for the Presidency now, since he predicts (somewhat pres-
ciently) “there might be a Negro President in the year 2011” and it would no 
longer be cool to seek higher office.55  If he were elected President, the first 
thing he would do is “decree Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana 
out of the Union.”56  In dreams, of course, one can envision the possibility 
of democratic justice without worrying too much about legal limits.  Put 
aside any constitutional restrictions on presidential power: as Chief Execu-
tive, Simple would hand those states to the Devil to “straighten them out,” 
but he would show mercy to all the dogs.57  A presidential rescue of South-
ern canines would show him to be a wise leader, since Simple elsewhere 
laments that segregationists in the South treat blacks worse than they treat 
animals.58 
  
 51. HUGHES, supra note 57, at 192.  
 52. See, e.g., LANGSTON HUGHES, Rude Awakening, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 127. 
 53. HUGHES, supra note 61, at 240. 
 54. LANGSTON HUGHES, For President, in THE LATER SIMPLE STORIES, supra note 61, at 187, 187. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 188. 
 57. Id. On the dangers of constitutional dictatorship, see Jack Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: 
Its Dangers and Its Designs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitu-
tion, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). 
 58. Simple observes on another occasion that during the days of slavery, “a good bloodhound was 
worth more than a good Negro, because a bloodhound were trained to keep the Negroes in line.  If a 
bloodhound bit a Negro, nothing were done to the dog.  In fact, Negroes were supposed to be bit.” 
LANGSTON HUGHES, Dog Days, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 103, 105.  “Even a black dog 
gets along better than me,” Simple laments.  “White folks socialize with dogs—yet they don’t want to 
socialize with me.”  LANGSTON HUGHES, Equality and Dogs, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4, 
at 152, 152.  “White dogs and black dogs all served together in the army, didn’t they?”  Id. at 153. 
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Simple’s dreams and ruminations revolve around several interlocking 
themes: combating a theory of white self-rule, exposing the hypocrisy of 
legal officials, exploring the wisdom of black empowerment, and question-
ing integration as the sole measure of democratic justice. 
1.  Dethroning White Sovereignty.  A recurring theme in the stories in-
volves combating the principle of white sovereignty, the belief that being 
born into White America entails not only the right to govern, but to exclude 
and oppress non-whites through the law.  “God made both of us,” Simple 
reminds, “[b]ut white people in the U.S.A. has got the upper hand—the 
whip hand—which they have had since the days of slavery.”59  This theory 
of law and politics, which called upon the people to deny the natural state of 
equality, long ago infected legal decision making.  The Supreme Court no-
toriously endorsed that concept in Dred Scott v. Sanford60 when it denied 
Congress the power to regulate slavery and deprive masters of their “proper-
ty.”61  Brown v. Board of Education62 may have spelled the beginning of the 
end of the government’s endorsement of white sovereignty, but alone the 
decision could not transform the value systems of average white Southern-
ers.63  Simple repeatedly suggests that racial sovereignty is a distinctly 
American belief: “White folks are not jackasses in Europe.”64 
Like other critical black writers, such as Ralph Ellison, Hughes believes 
that art can disrupt the neat, Manichaeistic belief system upon which racial 
power relies: white and black, wise and unsophisticated, innocent and 
guilty, just and unjust, order and chaos.65  In The Moon, Simple attacks the 
notion that racial sovereignty leads to happiness or prosperity.66  His strate-
gy is to undermine the logic of white power by testing its claim to superior 
virtue.67  In doing so, he puts the moral quality and practical consequences 
of politics ahead of any desire for cultural purity or racial solidarity: 
“White is right,” said Simple, “so I have always heard.  But I never 
did believe it.  White folks do so much wrong!  Not only do they 
mistreat me, but they mistreats themselves.  Right now, all they got 
  
 59. LANGSTON HUGHES, Haircuts and Paris, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 63, 63. 
 60. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 61. See id. at 451–52. 
 62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 63. On white sovereignty in American law, see MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS: DEFIANT 
VISIONS OF POWER AND COMMUNITY (2014). 
 64. HUGHES, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 71, at 64.  “In Europe they accepts colored peo-
ples as human beings,” Simple explains.  Id.  “Therefore Negroes can get their hair cut anywhere in any 
barbershop in Paris, France, or Rome, Italy, or Madrid, Spain.  Also Negroes can get shaved.  Here in the 
United States to get shaved, a white barber is liable to cut a colored man’s throat instead of trimming his 
beard.”  Id.  Once again, the character distills the inequity of segregation to tangible experiences, while 
hinting at the violence entailed in enforcing a vision of white sovereignty in everyday life. 
 65. See Jack Turner’s incisive essay on Ellison’s theory of “disinterested love” as a measure of 
democratic citizenship, Awakening to Race: Ralph Ellison and Democratic Individuality, 36 POL. 
THEORY 655 (2008). 
 66. LANGSTON HUGHES, The Moon, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at  27, 27–29. 
 67. Id.  
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their minds on is shooting off rockets and sending up atom bombs 
and poisoning the air and fighting wars and Jim Crowing the uni-
verse.68 
Having shown that white rule does not necessarily lead to wise rule, the 
character then exposes the absurdity of white sovereignty by suggesting that 
segregationists might well wish to keep outer space a black-free zone: 
I have not heard tell of no Negro astronaughts nowhere in space yet.  
This is serious, because if one of them white Southerners gets to the 
moon first, COLORED NOT ADMITTED signs will go up all over 
heaven as sure as God made little green apples, and Dixiecrats will 
be asking the man on the moon, ‘Do you want your daughter to 
marry a Nigra?’  Meanwhile, the NAACP will have to go to the Su-
preme Court, as usual, to get an edict for Negroes to even set foot 
on the moon.69 
Taking it a step further, Simple wonders whether “them Southerners 
will take police dogs to the moon,” which would then surely prompt Free-
dom Riders to shoot themselves into orbit to convey the people’s outrage.70  
After the reader stifles a chuckle, one sees that this extended “fantasy” is 
intended to show how racial hatred as well as love for others is in fact “a 
many-splintered thing.”71  In a world where even the most mundane interac-
tions are regulated by race laws, the author reminds the reader that segrega-
tionists’ dedication to their principles knows few bounds.  The scenario also 
reveals the folly of racial separation.  “Jim Crowing the universe”72 would 
entail restricting black-white relations in a place few people might ever set 
foot, and where meaningful social contact would be difficult in the absence 
of major technological advances.  Taken to its logical extreme, the project 
of white sovereignty can be exposed for its absurdity and waste.  Law itself, 
harnessed to reshape our surroundings according to some racialized vision, 
becomes devoid of meaning—directionless, lacking sense, illegitimate. 
2.  Exposing Hypocrisy.  Nothing enrages Simple more than hypocrisy 
on the part of the authorities or their abject failures to enforce the law.73  In 
matters of liberty and equality, he delights in showing how the left hand 
often does not know or does not care what the right hand is doing.74  From 
his skeptical perch on the bar stool, Simple contends that such inconsisten-
  
 68. Id. at 28. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 29. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 28. 
 73. See, e.g., LANGSTON HUGHES, Statutes and Statues, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 
153. 
 74. Id. 
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cies undermine the legitimacy of race-based laws.75  Reversing the age-old 
position that blacks needed to be civilized, Simple insists that white Ameri-
cans are the ones today in need of better home training: “White folks at 
times can certainly be contrary,” but “[t]hat is no way to behave in our 
democratic day and age,” he admonishes.76 
In one humorous passage, he notes that all day long, Southern Gover-
nors preach against race-mixing, “[t]hen, after nightfall, them governors 
themselves start mixing as hard as they can.”77  These same elected officials 
abhor intermarriage, but say precious little about all that “inter-mating” go-
ing on in the dark.  According to Simple’s diagnosis of segregation, the law 
cannot be taken seriously when its enforcers do not live their own legal po-
sitions, in private as well as in public.  To suggest that the law does not have 
independent integrity is an implicit critique of process-based theories of the 
law, which hold that democratically enacted measures are imbued with suf-
ficient legitimacy so as to render the law’s inconsistencies merely second-
order problems.78  To the contrary, the author demands greater harmony 
between the actions of a law’s proponents and their legal commitments.  
The legitimacy of the law turns on its moral content, backed by regular en-
forcement.  It is a high standard, to be sure, but one that accords with his 
ethically-based theory of law. 
Simple becomes furious when, during a dream about the afterlife, he is 
met at the Gates of Heaven by both St. Peter and the “Old Governor of Mis-
sissippi, Alabama, or Georgia, or wherever he is from.”79  The pair bars his 
entry and tells him to use the Colored Entrance around the back.80  Simple’s 
greatest nightmare has come to pass: “White folks have done got up there 
and made an American out of Saint Peter” and somehow found a way to 
racialize God’s eternal law.81  For Simple, divine law has been corrupted by 
a distinctive, racial nationalism.82  He is told by the Old Governor: “You are 
not inside yet, Simple.  Therefore, you are still black.  White is right, black 
get back!”83  Uncharacteristically driven to action, Simple threatens to beat 
them both with his wings.84  St. Peter intercedes and admonishes, “Jesse B., 
  
 75. See generally LANGSTON HUGHES, SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1. 
 76. LANGSTON HUGHES, Reason and Right, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 147, 147. 
 77. LANGSTON HUGHES, With All Deliberate Speed, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 
67, 67. 
 78. For process-based theories of law, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 79. LANGSTON HUGHES, Golden Gate, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 94, 95. 
 80. Id. at 95. 
 81. Id. at 97. 
 82. He makes the point that racial sovereignty is culturally specific with characteristic flair: “‘White 
folks are not jackasses in Europe,’ says Simple. ‘In Europe they accepts colored peoples as human be-
ings.’”  HUGHES, supra note 71. 
 83. HUGHES, supra note 95, at 95–96. 
 84. Id. at 96. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149663
File: Tsai_Final.clean.doc Created on: 10/23/14 9:13 PM Last Printed: 10/23/14 9:14 PM 
2013] “Simple” Takes on the Supreme Court 47 
we go for nonviolence in heaven.”85  Meanwhile, the Old Governor’s spirit 
runs off to look for his dogs to sic on Simple.86 
This scene underscores the theme of hypocrisy in enforcing the laws, 
with authorities saying one thing while doing another.  While St. Peter rep-
resents the aspirational, benevolent face of the law, the Old Governor signi-
fies legal violence untethered from principle.  Simple’s dream reveals how 
white power can corrupt higher law.  Illustrating how the moral authority of 
the law can become diluted, St. Peter throws up his arms and explains to 
Simple, “Heaven is so full of white folks now I have no control over it any 
more.”87  The dream dissipates with Simple rallying the dearly departed to 
defend their dignity and threatening to tear down the Golden Gate.  But, 
leaving the fate of the law unresolved, the sequence ends before any listen-
ers can respond to his call to action. 
In another flight of fancy, Simple shares a dream he had in which pan-
icked blacks trample a white woman as everyone rushes to a bomb shelter.88  
Diagnosing the situation, Boyd tells Simple he must have been “[g]etting rid 
of your hostilities” and “working out your own evil by way of a dream.”89  
Boyd’s statement flags the possibility that legal racism has an impact on the 
imagination of citizens—yet another cost of this type of democratic injus-
tice. 
Simple ultimately decides that the trampling scenario could never hap-
pen in the South because they would likely build no shelters for blacks, and 
“[i]f they did, it would be a little old Jim Crow shelter in Uncle Tommy’s 
back yard meant just for handkerchief heads.”90  Boyd shakes his head in 
disbelief, as he often does, at Simple’s stories of racial injustice: “Do you 
mean to tell me the white South would be so inhumane as to build public 
bomb shelters with signs up WHITE ONLY, and none for Negroes?”91  As a 
Northerner, the narrator often expresses shock at the lengths to which seg-
regationists would go to protect white self-rule.  Boyd is never sure what is 
the truth, given Simple’s penchant for exaggeration.  By the end of the sto-
ry, one’s attention has been turned away from the horrors of segregation 
back to Simple’s ludicrous dream, with the all-black survivors in the bomb 
shelter making the best of a frightening situation, “singing and shouting the 
  
 85. Id. 
 86. Hughes returns to the idea of segregationists who dream of an all-white Heaven in Cracker 
Prayer.  LANGSTON HUGHES, Cracker Prayer, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 124, 125.  
There, he imagines how a mean “old cracker” would pray to the Lord: “Lord, if there be educated Nigras 
in heaven, keep them out of my sight.  The only thing I hate worse than an educated Nigra is an integrat-
ed one. . . . As You is my Father, Lord, lead me not into black pastures, but deliver me from integration, 
for Thine is the power to make all men as white as snow.”  Id. 
 87. HUGHES, supra note 95, at 95. 
 88. LANGSTON HUGHES, Atomic Dream, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 54, 54. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 55. 
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blues.”92  In this way, the author reminds his readers of the indefatigable 
capacity of black Americans to survive legal inequities. 
3.  Facilitating Black Empowerment.  Black powerlessness remains a 
related theme in the stories, despite the improving legal condition of African 
Americans.  “The Constitution, the government, the law are now all on the 
Negro’s side,” Boyd notes optimistically.93  “But is Uncle Sam?” wonders 
Simple.94  Noting that Uncle Sam is always depicted as a white man, he 
states, “Uncle Sam do not have to sue in the Supreme Court every time he 
wants to get a cup of coffee down South . . . Neither do Uncle Sam have to 
sue in Mississippi every time he wants to vote.”95  There have been white 
leaders sympathetic to the plight of blacks—Roosevelt, Kennedy, John-
son—but the fate of the black community has all too often depended on the 
grace of others.   
Not so in Simple’s imagination.  At night, he keeps alive the possibility 
of black participation in self-rule.96  In one dream sequence, African Ameri-
cans have taken over the South, and Thurgood Marshall has risen to Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court.97  The Court has helped whites by “granting 
everybody the right to file another suit to get their rights.”98  Engaging in a 
bit of wry role reversal, Simple is portrayed as a rich man who says: 
Just because a handful of old Negroes wearing robes in the Supreme 
Court says your rights are constitutional, it does not mean they are 
institutional.  Our great institutions like the University of Jefferson 
Lee belong to us, and not even with all deliberate speed do we in-
tend to constitutionalize the institutionalization of our  
institutions.99 
He observes that legal values must become entrenched to be effective.  
Simple’s play-acting as a member of an imagined black majority does not 
go too far, though he has fun ordering “Mammy Faubus” to fix him a mint 
julep and fetch his palm-leaf fan.100 
Interestingly enough, Frank Johnson, a white Fifth Circuit judge who 
dutifully enforced desegregation orders at great personal cost, is recast (in a 
seemingly honorific artistic gesture) as a colored jurist who nevertheless 
  
 92. Id.  Elsewhere, the character expresses his fear that if he were in Mississippi, “I would be Jim 
Crowed out of bomb shelters, so I would need some kind of protection.”  LANGSTON HUGHES, Radioac-
tive Red Caps, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 53, 54.  But the legal process being as slow 
as it is, Simple continues, “[b]y the time I got the NAACP to take my case to the Supreme Court, the war 
would be over, else I would be atomized.”  Id. 
 93. LANGSTON HUGHES, Uncle Sam, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 176, 177. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. HUGHES, supra note 61, at 127. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 130. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 132. 
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helps white protestors by issuing nominal fines.101  But, alas, the white 
youths would not be helped, saying they would rather stay in jail until they 
can eat in “fine black barbecue joints where white folks never been known 
to eat before.”102  The moral of the story is that when blacks finally get to 
enjoy political power, they can be counted upon to exercise wisdom and 
justice, unlike their white counterparts.  Before anything transpires to ruin 
the vision of black rule, however, daybreak comes and Simple “woke up to 
the same old nightmare.”103 
4.  Beyond Integration.  One of Simple’s consistent critiques of the law 
is that it has all too often been distorted to preserve the comfort and sensi-
bilities of white Americans.104  His recommendations for how to subvert the 
system are uniformly hilarious, if a bit shocking.   
Simple launches a devastating, multi-prong attack on the liberal pro-
gram of integration.  For the sake of argument, he treats integration as a 
serious goal, but doubts that the authorities are sufficiently committed to 
substantive equality.105  He believes that for true integration to be effective, 
it would require “a fuse, else a blowtorch,” to ensure that prejudice is “[n]ot 
just melted down, but burnt up.”106  No trace of race prejudice could remain 
in a constitutional order characterized by democratic justice.  Because liber-
als show little stomach for such social engineering, integration must instead 
be about improving appearances—and promoting equality as a form of ci-
vility.  Simple rejects this conception of equality as insufficient to render 
democratic justice.107  Merely seeking to create the appearance of social 
equality, as the courts do through busing orders, is a superficial goal and 
ultimately corrosive of social ties. 
Simple has a similar critique of bans on interracial marriage, though this 
time he accuses white politicians of stoking the politics of distraction.108  
His position on the controversy is straightforward: despite all the huffing 
and puffing of white leaders, law has no place in this realm.109  “All a white 
girl has to do to keep from marrying a Negro is to say, ‘No,’” he points out 
matter-of-factly.110  Simple himself is twice married, having earlier had a 
youthful marriage break up.111  The issue of marriage whips people up, and 
he says that he has “got a great many other things to worry about besides 
intermarriage.”112  Though he chides politicians for making so much out of 
  
 101. Id. at 131. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 132. 
 104. See LANGSTON HUGHES, Great Day, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 64.  See also 
LANGSTON HUGHES, Duty is not Snooty, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 29. 
 105. See HUGHES, Duty is not Snooty, supra note 123, at 29. 
 106. HUGHES, Great Day, supra note 123, at 65. 
 107. See id. 
 108. LANGSTON HUGHES, Race Relations, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4, at 214, 214. 
 109. LANGSTON HUGHES, The Atomic Age, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 81, 81. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Klotman, supra note 21, at 70. 
 112. HUGHES, supra note 109, at 81. 
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the issue, the more he thinks about it, the more he comes to the realization 
that a pro-interracial marriage position may be best for racial harmony in 
the long run.113  Significant numbers of white men and black women may 
oppose intermarriage at the moment, “[b]ut if the races are ever going to 
relate, they must also mate, then you will have race relations.”114  To rein-
force the sense that his idea merely recognizes existing social practice, Sim-
ple points out that “the South has always done more relating than anybody 
else.  There are more light-skinned Negroes in the South whose pappy was a 
white man than there is in all the rest of this whole American country.”115  
So, there is hope. 
It is hard to know how seriously the character takes his own proposal to 
fuse families in the name of good order, for racial mixing behind closed 
doors has gone on longer than official policies of racial separation.  But the 
pun allows him to air a perspective—and a solution—surely considered 
taboo in many quarters.  And he reminds, once again, that social integration 
shouldn’t be an empty slogan, but rather a plan with very real consequenc-
es.116  If biology is political destiny, as some argue, then perhaps the theory 
can be put to use in the name of democratic justice. 
Beyond getting the law out of private domains (or at least matching ac-
tual social practice), Simple’s pleas for racial equality can be quite modest: 
“I wants me a train-station toilet with everything in it everybody else has 
got.”117  He unmasks the Supreme Court’s infamous ruling in Plessy v. Fer-
guson118 as a thinly-disguised effort to promote white comfort at the ex-
pense of black indignities.119  “There is nothing like a COLORED toilet in a 
Southern train station!  Half the time, no mirrow, no paper towels, some-
times no sink even to wash your hands.  They is separate, all right, but not 
equal.”120  By reducing the complaints of black Americans to such a visceral 
level, he makes the question of equality one of truly basic human 
(in)dignity. 
Reinforcing this theme of bodily indignity elsewhere,121 he tells a ridic-
ulous, sad story about a black G.I. who has to go to the bathroom so badly 
he has no time to wait for the colored latrine to become free.122  When a 
white M.P. threatens to shoot him if he enters the white latrine, the black 
soldier brandishes his own weapon in order to answer nature’s call.123  The 
  
 113. HUGHES, supra note 127, at 214. 
 114. Id. at 215. 
 115. Id. at 215. Not only do these ideas gesture toward the older but prevalent American mixing pot 
ideal, it also accords with the more provocative Ellisonian position that all Americans are mulattoes.  See 
Turner, supra note 78, at 669–72. 
 116. HUGHES, supra note 127, at 216.   
 117. HUGHES, Great Day, supra note 123, at 30. 
 118. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1986), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
 119. See HUGHES, Great Day, supra note 123, at 29–32. 
 120. Id. at 30. 
 121. HUGHES, supra note 26, at 122-23. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 123. 
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point is not simply that segregationists are foolhardy for trying to stand in 
the way of human nature.  It is also a reminder about the violence that lies at 
the heart of legalized inequality.  That the loyal black soldier must resort to 
his own show of force serves as a reminder that even the smallest legal dis-
ruption may expose resistors to danger or punishment. 
The most infamous legal arguments on behalf of Jim Crow invoke the 
state’s police power to fight crime or to preserve the moral welfare of the 
people.  According to this empirically-oriented approach, blacks are pre-
sumed to have a propensity for criminality, or racial unrest is reasonably 
likely to break out when social mixing occurs.124  Simple sees the public 
order argument as nothing more than a cynical ploy to retain white privi-
lege.  He lashes out at those who claim that racial separation promotes the 
peace: “What kind of peace are you talking about?  That is the trouble with 
you white folks, always wanting peace, and I ain’t got no privileges.  You 
are always keeping the best of everything for yourself.  All the peace is on 
your side.”125  In his takedown of segregation, he also challenges the law’s 
claim of neutral decision making.126  Though seemingly neutral in the ab-
stract, the public order argument is anything but race-neutral in practice.  
Whenever the social order argument is trotted out, blacks are invariably cast 
as disturbers of the peace, and white property, convenience, and sensibilities 
are consistently treated as a segregated society’s prize possessions.127  The 
fruits of “peace” are available to be savored only by the white majority. 
If Simple held a position of authority, he would entertain creative, even 
extreme measures to defend the constitutional rights of black Americans.  
He is all for public spectacle to bring down segregation, the more spectacu-
lar, the better.  “For freedom’s sake—and adventure,” he would arrange 
tours of the “Savage South” for white Northerners.128  He would make sure 
whites run into blacks in order to guarantee adventure.  The ads might read: 
“SPECIAL RATES FOR A WEEK-END IN A TYPICAL MISSISSIPPI JAIL.  Get 
arrested now, pay later.  Bail money not included.  Have the time of your 
lives living the life of your times among the Dixie White Skins.”129  It readi-
ly becomes apparent that Simple believes commercial tourism can serve the 
ends of political activism.  With a twinkle in his eye, he predicts that “[i]f . . 
. the white old folks go as sight-seers . . . no sooner than they got down 
there, they would be Freedom Riders anyhow,” joining the student-led pro-
tests.130 
Congress, usually counted upon by whites for the vindication of their 
rights and interests, gets very little treatment in the stories.  That is likely 
because until the mid-1960s, Congress was not perceived as hospitable to 
  
 124. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549-51 (1896). 
 125. See LANGSTON HUGHES, Puerto Ricans, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 73, 75. 
 126. See id. at 73–76. 
 127. Id. 
 128. LANGSTON HUGHES, Adventure, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 66, 66–68. 
 129. Id. at 68. 
 130. Id. 
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minorities.131  The institution’s failure to pass a civil rights bill stands as 
poignant evidence of congressional detachment or downright hostility.  
Simple has a few choice words for colored congressmen who stand by while 
“them old white Southerners filibuster [each civil rights bill] to hell and 
gone.”132  When Boyd reminds him that it takes many people to keep a fili-
buster going, this only whips Simple into a frenzy.133  If he were a member 
of Congress, he “would filibuster to keep them filibusters from starting a 
filibuster.”134  He would keep the fate of his race foremost in his mind: 
for my people I would talk until my tongue hung out of my mouth.  
I would talk until I could not talk no more!  Then, I would use sign 
language.  When I got through with that, I would get down on my 
knees and pray in silence.  And nobody better not strike no gavel 
while I am communicating with my Maker. . . . I would be the 
greatest one-man filibuster of all time, daddy-o!135 
Simple has some bills in mind, should legislative gridlock ever be over-
come.  One of his proposals involves Congress enacting “a few Game Pre-
serves for Negroes.”136  It is not as if the strategy has not been used before 
for endangered species: “The government protects and takes care of buffa-
loes and deers—which is more than the government does for me or my kin-
folks down South.”137  He explains that the federal government “ought to set 
aside some place where we can go and nobody can jump on us and beat us, 
neither lynch us nor Jim Crow us every day.  Colored folks rate as much 
protection as a buffalo, or a deer.”138  Simple deftly turns legal separation 
from a dehumanizing practice into a policy that would meet humanitarian 
objectives.  In making the case for a sanctuary, he harkens to older dreams 
of a black homeland on American soil.139  What about the risk of a filibus-
ter?  Simple thinks Southerners would be glad to get rid of blacks, but then 
“who would they lynch?”140 
Because of the failures of an unwieldy, hostile Congress, and only occa-
sional help from friendly presidents,141 blacks have come to rely heavily on 
  
 131. See Warren M. Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 1–5 (1965) (explaining Congress’s history of inaction on minority issues). 
 132. LANGSTON HUGHES, For the Sake of Argument, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4, at 
185, 189. 
 133. Id. at 189. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 189–90. 
 136. LANGSTON HUGHES, There Ought to Be a Law, in SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, supra note 4, at 
114, 115. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 116. 
 139. TSAI,  supra note 76. 
 140. HUGHES, supra note 155, at 117. 
 141. It is telling, though, that Eleanor Roosevelt is accorded privileged status in Simple’s mind, 
winning several references for her pro-equality stances, while her husband gets barely any mention. 
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the legal system.  It is to Simple’s imaginative takeover of the Supreme 
Court and its vision of legal justice that we now turn. 
II.  TAKING ON THE SUPREME COURT 
The United States Supreme Court is a fixture in the Simple stories, il-
lustrating how all eyes were on that institution, before and after Brown.142  
That African Americans have had to resort to the courts time and again is an 
indictment of white voters and evidence of the fragility of liberal progress. 
Simple longs “to see the day when I would not have to hire a lawyer to go to 
the Supreme Court to eat in a restaurant in Virginia.”143 
While litigation became the primary approach to securing the rights of 
African Americans, Simple’s stories suggest that not everyone in the black 
community was comfortable with this focus, nor confident of meaningful 
progress.  The Supreme Court frequently serves as a foil, to dramatize the 
different possible popular reactions to its interpretations of the nation’s fun-
damental law.144  After Brown is decided, Simple shares his mixed feelings 
in Great but Late.145  While it is certainly the right decision, “’It’s about 
time’ says Simple.”146  He is particularly incensed by the self-congratulatory 
reactions to the case: “I don’t see nothing to be proud of—just doing what 
they ought to do.”147  He likens the situation to a person who has had a foot 
on someone’s neck for so long and then cried, “Ain’t I wonderful! I took my 
foot off your head!”148  Instead of beating their chests for the courageous 
decision, whites “ought to be ashamed of themselves for Jim Crowing us so 
long.  I might have had a good education myself had it not of been for white 
folks.”149  Here, Simple suggests that humility, so sorely lacking in liberal 
triumphalism, would be consistent with genuine remorsefulness.  Since the-
se sincere sentiments are lacking (and not demanded by the Court’s own 
ruling), it is hard to believe that a true transformation in social relations has 
occurred. 
Moreover, litigation is expensive for the oppressed, and segregationists 
themselves have spent untold millions resisting legal progress.  And all for 
what?  “[A] step forward for people who was so far back” but hardly a step 
ahead.150  In fact, the judicial ruling represents only a first step, and a mod-
est one at that: “All they done is start to catch up—and they’re putting that 
  
 142. E.g., HUGHES, supra note 61, at 127; LANGSTON HUGHES, Jim Crow’s Funeral, in SIMPLE 
STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 118, 120. 
 143. HUGHES, Jim Crow’s Funeral, supra note 161, at 118, 120. 
 144. See LANGSTON HUGHES, Great but Late, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 33. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 33. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 35. 
 149. Id. at 33. 
 150. Id.  
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off until sometime in the future when they can work things out with all de-
liberate speed.”151  In other words, never. 
The theme of the law merely relegating blacks to playing catch-up with 
whites is a powerful criticism of the Warren Court.152  But it goes even 
deeper, as it captures a popular impatience with inadequate liberal solutions.  
On this view, the Justices settled for glory and the easy win by trying to 
engineer integrated schools rather than attempting a more comprehensive 
but infinitely more challenging solution to racial injustice.153  An intergen-
erational violation of the Constitution requires an intergenerational remedy, 
Simple says, but desegregation orders benefit only current and future stu-
dents.154  Simple finds himself among the class of ordinary people left out: 
“I am happy . . . for all the colored kids still going to school and all the folks 
still in the South,” he explains.155  “But what about the folks as old as me 
who went to them ramshackle old beat-up shacks they had for colored 
schools down home all this time?”156  One alternative would be court-
ordered compensation for those denied an equal education.  “If they want 
something to be proud of,” Simple demands, “let them pay me for all the 
education I ain’t got.”157  That compensation has been taken off the table for 
older African Americans demonstrates how (not so) far activists and judges 
are willing to go.   
In a larger sense, Simple’s character symbolizes missed opportunities 
for American law.  The law’s achievements should be measured according 
to tangible gains, not merely the vindication of worthy abstractions.  When 
Boyd gushes that “Negroes today are being rapidly integrated into every 
phase of American life,” Simple reminds him that “I have not advanced one 
step . . . . Still the same old job, same old salary, same old kitchenette, same 
old Harlem and the same old color.”158  Through that short colloquy, he 
declares it his duty, as much as it is the responsibility of elites, to shine the 
light on the areas unreached by the Constitution. 
A. Remaking Equality 
A coherent theory of equality can be stitched together from Simple’s 
bar room commentary.  Although the character’s views are expressed 
piecemeal over decades, they emerged from the pen of a single public intel-
lectual who had long engaged legal and political questions through his art.  
Four elements make up Hughes’s popular conception of equality: authen-
  
 151. Id. 
 152. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1992). 
 153. Id. at 709–17 (arguing that Brown reflects the Court trying to resolve the “dilemmas of liberal 
individualism” by backing away from more radical forms of social restructuring in favor of short-term 
symbolic gains in promoting racial neutrality and individual dignity).  
 154. See HUGHES, supra note 163, at 34. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 33. 
 158. HUGHES, supra note 111, at 53. 
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ticity, reciprocity, charity, and opportunity.  Equality must arise from au-
thentic sentiments rather than merely being compelled by others.  Beyond 
placing a limit on what government can do, sincere actions taken in the 
name of equality must foster reciprocal relationships.  Charity must replace 
civility as the ideal for the ties among citizens.  It follows that ending dis-
crimination can be only an opening step; a meaningful opportunity to pursue 
the good life must represent the ultimate end of democratic  
justice. 
In the vignette, Empty Houses,159 Simple articulates his conception of 
equality, which differs significantly from the pursuit of equal protection of 
the law then underway in the legal system.160  At its heart is the idea of gen-
erosity, exhibited when something of value is freely given.  He describes an 
instance when, as a young boy, a white man bought him an ice cream cone 
on a hot day, “without being asked or hauled up before the Supreme 
Court.”161  This unremarkable act of kindness was all it took to ensure he 
does not “hate all white folks today.”162   
Though Simple believes more must be done to ensure equality, he is not 
a mindless leveler.  He derides overly formal theories of equality, especially 
“[t]it for tat” expectations that accompany any demand for equality of out-
comes: 
Some folks think that everything in life has to balance up, turn out 
equal.  If you buy a man a drink, he has to buy you one back.  If you 
get invited to a party, then you have to give a party, too, and invite 
whoever invited you.  My wife, Joyce, is like that—which makes 
folks end up having to give parties they do not want to give, and go-
ing to a lot of parties to which they do not want to go.163 
Simple warns against theories that require equality of outcomes, which 
can produce not only gratuitous behavior, but also inauthentic gestures.164  
Formal equality not only encourages inefficient uniformity, but also super-
ficiality.  Instead of civility or mindless tit-for-tat treatment, equality is bet-
ter stripped down to a more basic expression of charity.  Distilled to its es-
sence, the purest form of equality is selflessness.  Buying a beer for some-
one who is thirsty may seem like a very small thing, perhaps even nothing.  
But “[n]othing is everything,” says Simple, “when it comes from the 
heart.”165  The best evidence of true equality is when citizens treat each oth-
er with kindness without the compulsion of law.  
  
 159. LANGSTON HUGHES, Empty Houses, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 12. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 12–13. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 13. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. 
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This emphasis on the virtues of authenticity and charity confirms an 
ethical alternative to the Supreme Court’s notion of equality as fair treat-
ment.  As a dissenting theory of equality, Simple’s vision attacks the emerg-
ing juridical concept of equality as right conduct for being utterly impover-
ished.  To read the Equal Protection Clause166 as requiring merely fair 
treatment of others is to not demand enough of fellow citizens.  For Simple, 
the cramped juridical concept of equality is evidence that the High Court 
has abandoned the moral project of law.  One only seeks to regulate behav-
ior within narrow bounds after giving up on the possibility of ethical trans-
formation, believing it too hard to alter cultural attitudes.  Simple not only 
argues that robust equality is required by the Constitution, he also denies 
that it is an impossible task.  Thus, his reduction of the lofty aims of equali-
ty to common, visceral terms serves a twofold purpose: to make democratic 
justice accessible to more Americans and to deal with the lingering problem 
of political despair. 
If a thoughtless back-and-forth characterizes one type of danger pre-
sented by formal equality, hateful reprisals comprise another.  Only lasting 
ethical change can help the community avoid the pitfall presented by any 
project of democratic justice: the politics of resentment.  Though Simple 
jokes a great deal about the deeply entrenched attitudes of whites, he grasps 
that the politics of resentment are toxic.  One problem with formal equality 
is that it fosters the mindset that equality is a zero-sum game: that any im-
provement for blacks necessarily comes at the expense of whites.  There 
must be a way out of this destructive cycle of tit-for-tat, though escape can-
not come at the cost of equal opportunity. 
Making anti-discrimination the heart of equality, as elites have done,167 
is insufficient to spark an ethical transformation.  For one thing, it is a 
piecemeal approach, a requirement of fair treatment in select contexts.  For 
another, a person must already be advantaged—possess a job, a home, pro-
spects—before the principle of anti-discrimination can do much good.  
Without these antecedent events or tangible opportunities, civil rights laws 
do little for the average black citizen.  “The NAACP and the unions is wres-
tling over color bars in employment . . . but there is no color bar in unem-
ployment” Simple complains, pointing out the narrowness of the civil rights 
agenda.168  “When a man is unemployed and out of work, be he black or 
white, his pockets is equally empty.”169 
Simple thus suggests a way forward by turning to material improvement 
and enhanced opportunities after ethical transformation has begun to take 
  
 166. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 167. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 8 (1996) 
(identifying antidiscrimination as the primary route through which to foster a culture of equality); Paul 
Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976). 
 168. HUGHES, supra note 35, at 146. 
 169. Id.  
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hold.170  According to this vision of the law, true equality means rectifying 
untended economic inequities.171  Previously unseen structural conditions 
reinforce racial subjugation.  Without either ethical or material change, no 
amount of tinkering with the law can truly level the playing field.  At the 
same time, thinking of rights in economic terms offers a tantalizing possibil-
ity for overcoming a zero-sum mindset, in which every gain for the op-
pressed entails a loss for everyone else.  Apart from death, Simple implies, 
poverty is the great equalizer.172  Race may never become irrelevant to 
American law, but the sooner that the authorities turn their attention to im-
proving the material conditions of citizens, the more likely that support for 
democratic justice will emerge. 
None of these ruminations on equality means that Simple opposes 
court-centered jurisprudence or civil rights, only that he feels that activist-
driven, judicially managed solutions fail to reach many of the gritty, every-
day interactions among the people.173  In this sense, his humanistic critique 
of the law exposes legal liberalism’s limits.  Judicial decisions rarely impact 
the most intimate interactions between human beings.  Unless coercion is 
cleverly applied, it is unlikely to produce a change of sentiment.  Grudging 
obedience falls short of true equality.  Compulsion can breed false charity or 
feigned toleration rather than an authentic change of heart as to the intrinsic 
dignity of fellow human beings.  Simple certainly has no sympathy for the 
segregationist who “gets hot under the collar when the Supreme Court 
edicts an edict that don’t stick.”174  Ultimately, Simple believes that equal 
dignity must somehow bloom in the dark places far away from the glare of 
public litigation and the media.175 
One of Simple’s major complaints is that judge-centered justice has 
blinded officials and ordinary Americans to the injuries suffered by blacks 
who are not currently in school.176  Legal solutions, in other words, have not 
been popular enough in terms of coverage and support among the constitu-
encies of democratic justice.  In this way, he reminds readers that the prob-
lem of race is an intergenerational one that requires a remedy of the same 
magnitude: “We are a broke race of people,” Simple announces, a collective 
financial state that must be laid at the foot of a legal system that for so long 
protected slaveholders and white supremacists.177  His preferred legal reme-
dy is reparations: “I am all for trying to collect what is owed my great 
grandpa and grandma from slavery days for all that free labor my ancestries 
did in this American country!”178  True to his nature, Boyd raises statute-of-
  
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. HUGHES, supra note 54 at 188. 
 175. See, e.g., id. at 51–53. 
 176. See HUGHES, supra note 163, at 34. 
 177. HUGHES, supra note 87, at 153. 
 178. Id. 
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limitations problems, but for Simple, procedural obstacles can never stand 
in the way of higher law obligations taken on by the people.  When unjust 
enrichment of this scale is involved, the remedy must match the violation. 
B. A Role for Poetic Justice 
Simple goes beyond articulating a popular concept of equality to rival 
what is developing in the courts.  He also articulates what a satisfactory 
remedy might entail, issuing his own judicial decrees.  In these moments, he 
ventures into presenting an account of ideal judging and a striking brand of 
poetic justice. 
On several occasions, Simple fantasizes about how to ensure that white 
Americans actually commit to practicing equality in the long run.  In the 
1950s, at the height of desegregation, he toys with the idea of role-reversal 
as the key to promoting structural change.  His recommendation: “White 
folks that love me and care about my race ought to sleep in colored hotels 
when they travel.”179  According to Simple’s diagnosis, “[w]hite folks has 
got a theoretical knowledge of prejudice” and they must acquire “a real 
one.”180  Once again, a plausible theory of equality must be driven by actual 
experiences on the ground. 
By suffering through the indignities of prejudice firsthand, whites might 
finally understand what is wrong with Jim Crow and become moved to 
eliminate it.  Experiential learning about racism would teach Northern 
whites that true equality means something more than civility: 
It is not enough for white folks just to be nice and shake my hand 
and tell me I am equal.  I know I am equal.  What I want is to be 
treated equal.  So maybe if the nice white folks really find out what 
it is like not to be treated equal—after they live Jim Crow them-
selves—I bet you, things will change!  You know, white folks 
would not put up with Jim Crow—if they ever got Jim Crowed 
themselves.181 
For Simple, the privilege of citizenship imposes on whites a “duty to 
find out” the full extent of their own constitutional violation, and “duty can-
not be snooty.”182  Self-scrutiny must be undertaken with a measure of hu-
mility, otherwise moral lessons are not likely to take.  When knowledge of 
injustice is honestly and viscerally acquired, there can be little choice left 
but to spring to action.  In its earliest iteration, a reversal of fortune is mere-
ly suggested, a voluntary test of one’s democratic commitment. 
  
 179. HUGHES, Duty is not Snooty, supra note 123, at 29. 
 180. Id. at 31. 
 181. Id. at 31–32. 
 182. Id. at 32. 
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Soon enough, the author’s idea of role-reversal is developed into a full-
scale remedy for dealing with recalcitrant white Southerners and for bring-
ing a measure of justice to aggrieved black citizens.  In Promulgations,183 
Simple contemplates what he would do if he “was setting in the High Court 
in Washington.”184  He declares, “I would bang my gavel and promulgate” 
law, followed by additional “promulgations that would take place if people 
did not obey my laws.”185  In a swipe at the sitting Justices for their coward-
ice, Simple promises not to “be paid a big salary just to read something off a 
paper.”186  He would metaphorically take to the streets to ensure compliance 
with the Constitution: “I would gird on my sword, like in the Bible, and 
prepare to do battle.”187 
The Equal Protection Clause would be interpreted according to the 
Christian maxim: “Love thy neighbor as thyself.”188  From John Brown to 
Martin Luther King, Jr., popular legal theorists have often urged such a 
love-centered theory of equality.  At the same time, conjuring the Old Tes-
tament vision of justice allows Simple to propose remedies from which the 
Warren Court would surely cringe, in the name of a benevolent vision of 
law.  Girding on the sword evokes Jesus’s call to render popular judgment: 
“[I]f you have no sword, sell your cloak and buy one.”189  Simple’s judg-
ment, rendered with humility but without remorse, “will pierce your soul . . 
. so that the secret thoughts of many may be laid bare.”190 
According to the jurisprudence of the common man, the most effective 
remedy for transgressing higher law would be court-ordered role reversal: 
“The first man I caught who did not love his neighbor as hisself, I would 
make him change places with his neighbor—the rich with the poor, the 
white with the black, and Governor Faubus with me.”191  The injunction 
echoes Jesus of Nazareth’s teaching that “the last will be first, and the first, 
last,” a Christian judgment in which the powerful and powerless ultimately 
trade places.192  But Simple is not concerned with the End of Days; he is 
  
 183. LANGSTON HUGHES, Promulgations, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 160, 160. 
 184. Id. at 160. 
 185. Id. at 160. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.; see also Mark 12:31 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
 189. Luke 22:36–38 (New Jerusalem Bible) (“He said to them, ‘But now if you have a purse, take it, 
and the same with a haversack; if you have no sword, sell your cloak and buy one, because I tell you 
these words of scripture are destined to be fulfilled in me: He was counted as one of the  
rebellious.’”).   
 190. Luke 2:34–35 (New Jerusalem Bible).  The sword motif is a strong one in Christian accounts of 
judgment: “’Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth: it is not peace I have come to 
bring, but a sword.”  Matthew 10:34–35 (New Jerusalem Bible).  To be effective, justice must be power-
ful enough to reconfigure social boundaries, with the capacity to “set son against father, daughter 
against mother, daughter-in-law against mother-in-law; a person’s enemies will be the members of his 
own household.” Matthew 10:35-36 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
 191. HUGHES, supra note 202, at 160. 
 192. Matthew 20:16 (New Jerusalem Bible).  See also Mark 10:31 (New Jerusalem Bible) (“Many 
who are first will be last, and the last, first.”); Luke 13:30 (New Jerusalem Bible) (“Look, there are those 
now last who will be first, and those now first who will be last.”). 
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interested in fashioning justice within the bounds of secular law.  Only 
through such an ironic change in fortunes in this life would a violator expe-
rience loss, shame, remorse—all of the emotions that would need to be re-
turned to white folks who have for so long propped up a legal system that 
dehumanized their fellow man. 
Simple explains that he “would make Governor Faubus go to school 
again in Little Rock and study with them integrated students there and learn 
all over again the facts of life.”193  There, he would not only have to experi-
ence the very race mixing that he despises, but also learn his constitutional 
history: 
I decrees now and from here on out that you straighten up and fly 
right.  Cast off your mask of ignorance and hate and go study your 
history.  You have not yet learned that ‘taxation without representa-
tion is tyranny,’ which I learned in grade school.  You have also not 
learned that “all men are created equal,” which I learned before I 
quit school.  Educate yourself, Faubus, so that you can better rule 
your state.194 
The very thought of Orval Faubus, forever the angry face of segrega-
tion, forced to sit with black students in a school house is beyond hilarious.  
Simple’s desegregation order emerges from a jurisprudence of the literal, 
where the violator of equality is forced bodily to endure the race mixing he 
so deplores.  In Simple’s clever hands, the nation’s fundamental laws would 
not be rendered impotent through timid toleration of white resistance, but 
would instead become a resilient instrument capable of ensuring political 
justice.   
If he had the power to enforce the Constitution, Justice Simple would 
not be above trickery.  In the event Faubus defied the decree, Simple would 
whisper in the Governor’s ear that secret records show he has colored blood.  
“I am your third cousin,” Simple the trickster-judge would tell him.195  
“Whilst he was fainted,” Simple goes on, “I would pick him up and take 
him to a mixed school.  When he came to, he would be integrated.”196   And 
that would be that. 
In this incarnation of poetic justice, Simple goes well beyond Nuss-
baum’s ideal of the judge as “[i]ntimate and impartial, loving without bi-
as.”197  For her humanistic conception of judging, Nussbaum draws on Walt 
Whitman’s suggestion that the judge must “see[] eternity in men and wom-
en.”198  To Simple, however, democratic justice requires something more 
than sensitively rendered justice or the ability to appreciate the complexity 
  
 193. HUGHES, supra note 202, at 161. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. 
 197. NUSSBAUM, supra note 28, at 120. 
 198. Id. at 80. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149663
File: Tsai_Final.clean.doc Created on: 10/23/14 9:13 PM Last Printed: 10/23/14 9:14 PM 
2013] “Simple” Takes on the Supreme Court 61 
of life.  Dignity is an important idea, but one that requires a serious com-
mitment of institutional resources for its protection.  Because of Simple’s 
belief in equality as a powerful ethical ideal and not just a matter of proper 
conduct, justice demands a willingness to use state authority creatively to 
destroy the social foundations of hatred.199  As Simple puts it, “Rev. Martin 
Luther King tries to pray prejudice out, but sometimes I think we are gonna 
have to flay it out.”200 
Thus, Hughes would almost certainly reject Nussbaum’s model of com-
passionate judging as incomplete.  By employing the reversal of fortune 
motif, the author harkens to an older vision of justice in which the morally 
bankrupt face an ignominious end in a manner that matches their transgres-
sions.  Virtue, too, must be rewarded—something not guaranteed by a judge 
merely moved to exhibit compassion.  In one fantasy sequence, Simple her-
alds a “new day” when believers in white supremacy “will be cut down to 
size.”201  He suggests that racism arises from a deep-seated sense of status 
anxiety, but if the world no longer pays oppressors the same kind of atten-
tion and respect, “the white man is going to get so bugged he will go to 
pieces, start trembling and shaking, frothing at the mouth, and be so dizzy in 
the head that he will fall down and faint in front of them schools from which 
he has barred Negroes out.”202  At that point, “Negroes will just walk on in 
school and set down and start studying.”  When whites call to be helped up, 
blacks “will be too busy getting [their] arithmetic.”203 
The twist given by Hughes to this older conception of justice is twofold: 
poetic justice is transitional and its ultimate object is to civilize democratic 
citizens.  It recalls the judgment rendered in Dante’s Inferno,204 where 
through an “infernal irony” sinners are sentenced to undergo visceral pun-
ishments commensurate with their offenses against divine law.205  Yet 
Hughes is concerned not with eternal punishment, as Dante was, but rather 
with democratic justice in the here and now.  He does not call on white citi-
zens to abandon hope, but rather wishes to adjust their attitudes and expec-
tations through compelled self-inquiry.206  Eventually, the white man will 
wake up from his fainting spell to find blacks newly “hale, hearty, and fit to 
tell him off.”207  On the other side of the ledger, Simple seeks to restore 
some measure of hope to black Americans.  He never consigns whites to 
“eternal grief” for their wrongs, but instead pursues civic reeducation and 
  
 199. LANGSTON HUGHES, Flay or Pray?, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 118, 118–20. 
 200. Id. at 119.  Simple’s actions suggest that righteous rage is sometimes necessary to meet oppres-
sive force.  When Boyd observes, “You don’t believe in Rev. King’s policies of nonviolence,” Simple 
retorts: “Only for the nonviolent. . . . If I lived down South, I would lose my temper.”  Id. 
 201. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 70. 
 202. Id. at 71. 
 203. Id. 
 204. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE ALIGHIERI (Ciaran Carson trans. 2002). 
 205. JOHN FRECCERO, DANTE: THE POETICS OF CONVERSION 93–109 (1986). 
 206. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 69–72. 
 207. Id. at 71. 
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atonement.208  “If I were a judge I would not put nobody to death,” he ex-
plains.209  “I would just sentence the bad in them to die.”210 
After all, as a judge he would be doing only what generations of whites 
had demanded of blacks in civilizing them before extending the rights of 
citizenship.  Thus, Simple’s strategy of poetic justice is tempered by repub-
lican sentiments and the possibility of civic redemption.  It is borne not out 
of vengeance but of restoration.  Justice is constrained by a desire to break 
down illiberal attitudes and reintegrate the remade citizen in a new constitu-
tional order founded on charity and opportunity.  Now that the shoe is on 
the other foot—how can whites be heard to complain? 
Closing the gap between constitutional ideal and lived experience is a 
persistent refrain in the stories.211  From the perspective of ordinary people, 
equal protection of the law is a grossly under-enforced right.  In Color on 
the Brain, Simple contrasts the work of the High Court in striking down 
racial barriers with the long-held attitudes of white Southerners: 
[W]ith white people, their left hand don’t always know what their 
right hand doeth. . . . Meaning that their right hand, which is really 
the hand that is trying to do right—by which I mean the Supreme 
Court—has done decreed the end of Jim Crow.  But most white 
folks down South is nowhere near ready to go to school with me, let 
alone set on a bus seat with Negroes.212 
Simple’s diagnosis of the body politic claims hypocrisy on the part of 
decisionmakers or, at the very least, legal inconsistency (while recognizing 
congruence between legal outcomes and regional culture).  Whatever the 
alchemy of factors reinforcing democratic injustice, it will take a significant 
effort—more than judicial decrees alone—to ensure equal protection of the 
law.  One thing is certain: the Supreme Court has earned the wrath of die-
hard segregationists.  This alone suggests the possibility of legal change. 
Cracker Prayer213 pokes fun at such extreme reactions by imagining an “old 
cracker” praying to the Lord to be delivered from integration.214  The last 
thing he wants to see are “Nigras lined up telling me the Supreme Court has 
decreed integrated seats in the Celestial Chariot, too.”215  The prayer ends 
with the white supremacist defiantly telling the Lord that if his ride to 
Heaven has been integrated, he would rather risk God’s wrath and “elect to 
  
 208. DANTE ALIGHIERI, DANTE’S INFERNO: THE INDIANA CRITICAL EDITION 34 (Mark Masa ed., 
trans., 1995). 
 209. HUGHES, supra note 162, at 118. 
 210. Id.  Of course, if only Jim Crow were a human being, Simple “would not mind seeing Jim Crow 
die.”  Id. at 120.  In fact, he would gladly pay for the funeral, send flowers, and “even rise and preach his 
funeral.”  Id.  
 211. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 111, at 53, 53-57. 
 212. HUGHES, supra note 25, at 106. 
 213. HUGHES, supra note 102, at 126.   
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. 
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stay right here on earth where at least Faubus is on my side.”216  Clinging to 
a world organized according to unjust ordinary law, defenders of racial sov-
ereignty turn their backs to higher law. 
At times, Simple gestures toward the High Court as a way to deflate 
people’s expectations of solutions from above.  With All Deliberate Speed217 
takes its title from the Supreme Court’s follow-up ruling to Brown.218  In the 
story, Simple analyzes the angry burst of Southern defiance of judicial 
edicts.219  Channeling the Whiggish belief that “Democracy grows in an 
ever-widening arc,”220 Boyd counsels Simple to adopt the long view and 
predicts eventual compliance with the Court’s desegregation rulings.221  
Boyd announces confidently that“[o]nce the stone is dropped in the water—
in this case the Supreme Court decision regarding the schools—the circles 
of decency begin to spread and the healing waters to lap the shores of preju-
dice and wash away the sands of intolerance.”222  He is not alone in pro-
nouncing the Court’s efforts to promote equality as reasonable, gradual, and 
the safest answer to minimize Southern revolt.223 
Simple takes a “darker” view.  Against those who smugly tout gradual-
ism, he pessimistically points out: “That adjustment period . . . will be a 
lulu!”224  Unrest will follow regardless of whether defiance is brooked.  In 
fact, resistance could actually get worse because of the Court’s show of 
weakness.  A ruling intended to preserve order rather than mete out demo-
cratic justice will in fact embolden white folks who “do not have all these 
fine manners you read about in ‘Gone With the Wind,’ and they do not pay 
no attention to the law if they don’t want to.”225  Some brave black kids 
“will go tipping in, but flying out” as a result of segregationists’ “uncere-
monious” behavior in defying the highest court of the land.226  What Hughes 
offers, then, is the everyman’s rejection of a jurisprudence calculated to 
accommodate backlash politics.227 
  
 216. Id. 
 217. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 67. 
 218. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 219. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 67. 
 220. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 68. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 29 (1992) (commending the 
Brown Court for navigating the stakes with “extraordinary agility, even artistry”); Philip Elman & Nor-
man Silber, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: 
An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827 (1987) (claiming he originated the phrase “with all delib-
erate speed” and that “it offered the Court a way out of its dilemma, a way to end racial segregation 
without inviting massive disobedience, a way to decide the constitutional issue unanimously without 
tearing the Court apart”); Jim Chen, Poetic Justice, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 614 (2006) (defending 
both its accidental, literary genius as well as its effort to capture the social forces at work). 
 224. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 68. 
 225. Id. at 69. 
 226. Id. at 68–69. 
 227. For leading accounts of the backlash to Brown, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2006); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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“Until all deliberate speed catches up with a snail,” Simple recommends 
that black parents in the South be allowed to attend school with their chil-
dren to minimize shenanigans and protect loved ones.228  Even in the midst 
of razzing judicial elites, Simple has time to offer nuggets of common 
sense.  He then turns to a discussion of the toll on the poor families who 
must undergo this prolonged transition period.  As for himself, Simple says 
he will wait out the turbulence by staying in Harlem for fifteen or twenty 
years.  “My children will go to school right here where it don’t take no Su-
preme Court to get them in, and where I won’t have to go to school with 
them every day whilst they are getting adjusted.”229 
Just as quickly as he warns of the delay tactics practiced by defenders of 
white self-governance, he veers off into a fantasy about how the dark people 
of the world will teach the defiant “down-home cracker” a lesson by ignor-
ing him.230  Once the segregationist falls down in an apoplectic fit like a 
common bully deprived of the chance to relish the misery of his victims, 
blacks will enter the schoolhouse unobstructed and start studying furiously.  
The Supreme Court’s formula for enforcement will then become upended, 
as blacks could get their education in peace while “let[ting] them Southern-
ers lay there a few years on the cold, cold ground and get used to modera-
tion.”231  Only then, “with all deliberate speed,” should kindness be returned 
for evil.  By that point, blacks might have regained some of their lost oppor-
tunities, along with the know-how to exploit them.  In coopting the remedial 
formula, the author ingeniously informs readers that democratic justice must 
be about more than white comfort with integration.  Time, if used wisely, is 
also crucial for black disappointment to wane and trust in white Americans 
and political institutions to be regained. 
Intellectuals may laud the Warren Court for its statesmanship, but Sim-
ple sees “all deliberate speed” for what it is: a legal formula intended to 
promote incremental progress toward equality in actuality rewards foot-
dragging by opponents of equality.  Yet all is not lost.  If only social condi-
tions could somehow be completely subverted during the period of delay, 
and blacks could trade places with whites who have for so long benefited 
from policies of exclusion, then something approximating substantive jus-
tice might be achieved.  Simple’s perspective suggests the need for some 
sort of supplemental remedy for blacks who must suffer through such a 
long-term solution. 
Invoking Eisenhower, Simple offers his own gloss on “all deliberate 
speed”: “I would say, ‘These things take time.  Let the people of good will 
of both races work it out, meanwhile you lay in the mud.’”232  He would “let 
  
 228. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 69. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 71. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 71.  Simple thus offers a tongue-in-cheek answer to those who might say, enough with 
race-conscious remedies: Take a rest if you are exhausted!  On the recurring claim of majorities express-
ing fatigue with racial issues, see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U.L. REV. 
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them Southerners lay there a few years on the cold, cold ground and get 
used to moderation.”233  He invites others to “visualize the Southern white 
man prone” while the Southern negro becomes “hale, hearty, and fit to tell 
him off.”234  Once again, he suggests a form of counter-subordination re-
quiring the dramatic upsetting of social positions.  The moment that whites 
recovered from their fainting spell, legal action would again be necessary to 
ratify any transformation.  “The N.A.A.C.P. will have done carried my case 
to the Supreme Court, as usual . . . and won again.”235 
After each side has had a chance to walk in another’s shoes, in the 
shadow of the Constitution, the beginnings of reconciliation are possible.  
With right on their side, and having achieved some material gains, blacks 
would happily show compassion for their oppressors.  Simple himself prom-
ises to “set in school and sing with all deliberate speed, ‘I Shall Not Be 
Moved,’ and I would ask the white folks outside to join in the chorus.  After 
which I would invite them crackers into the schools to learn something too, 
because today they are just pure-D ignorant, that’s all.”236  Roles would be 
reversed: blacks formerly excluded from education would teach whites, who 
would now have to learn the lessons of liberty and equality.  Through this 
extended discussion, which is reminiscent of Jesus’s own stories inverting 
social hierarchy,237 Simple adapts his notion of equality to encompass truly 
heartfelt action and an appreciation of past harm.  With lacerating humor, he 
elevates the constitutional stakes of the fight over desegregation into a 
teaching moment. 
Simple harbors other misgivings about integration as a general, and al-
most singular, objective.  Even though elected officials, the NAACP, and 
jurists endorse desegregation as a model for achieving equality, Simple re-
sents the fact that legal conflict has reinforced white people’s tendency to 
see only “THE Negro, as if there was not 50-11 different kinds of Negroes in 
the U.S.A.”238  In Simple’s frustration, one can detect a criticism of the un-
intended consequences of modern interest group activism.  To create the 
sense of a political bloc, mobilize ordinary people, and influence official 
decisions, black leaders must claim to speak for the people.  But this strate-
gy has its drawbacks: it can depress contrarian sentiment, create the errone-
ous impression that all black Americans agree on a concept of the good life, 
and lead to complacency among whites once black leaders’ demands are 
met.  
In Coffee Break, Simple recounts a workplace conversation initiated by 
his white boss:  
  
917 (2009). 
 233. HUGHES, supra note 91, at 71. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 72. 
 236. Id.  
 237. See Matthew 20:16 (New Jerusalem Bible). 
 238. LANGSTON HUGHES, Coffee Break, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 80, 80. 
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My boss says, “Now that you-all have got the Civil Rights Bill and 
the Supreme Court, Adam Powell in Congress, Ralph Bunche in the 
United Nations, and Leontyne Price singing in the Metropolitan 
Opera, plus Dr. Martin Luther King getting the Nobel Prize, what 
more do you want?” 
“I am not THE Negro,” I says.  “I am me.” 
“Well,” says my boss, “you represent THE Negro.” 
“I do not,” I says, “I represent my own self.”239 
When Simple’s boss insists that Ralph Bunche, Thurgood Marshall, 
Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, and James Farmer all represent him, 
Simple stresses the distance between these leaders and the common man.  “I 
am proud to be represented by such men, if you say they represent me,” he 
observes, “But all them men you name are way up there, and they do not 
drink beer in my bar.”240  One should never confuse black leaders with the 
regular folks in whose name they act.  
What is more, the lives of ordinary people, especially those who do not 
have children in Southern schools, feel far removed from the highly charged 
activities covered in the press and the priorities of black leaders spearhead-
ing legal transformation.  Instead of being called “THE Negro”241 and under-
stood as part of a collective, Simple demands that his individual concerns be 
met.  “I am this Negro,” he defiantly tells his employer, and he demands 
to“get out” of “[t]he jail you got me in.”242  His boss is puzzled, missing his 
employee’s analogy of a low-wage job to an actual jail typifying Jim Crow 
conditions.  In the white employer’s view, once formal segregation has been 
overturned, democratic justice has been done.  To Simple, Brown absolves 
white guilt and closes the door on the past. 
The vignette also expresses anxiety that black leaders will not do 
enough to implement an ethical vision that would accomplish the most for 
all Americans.  Because they do not drink in the same bar he does, and have 
never been seen on Lenox Avenue, Simple worries that elites might not 
appreciate the full range of problems afflicting the black community.  He 
dissents from the tendency to flatten the black experience into a single nar-
rative, a single set of concerns, and a narrow solution.  It is instructive that 
Simple tries his best to dialogue with his white superior about the unintend-
ed consequences of in-group activist decisions, never giving up on the ideal 
of democratic debate.243  But it is also poignant that his personal effort to 
transcend the black-white divide on that occasion fails.  The moment that 
Simple declares he wants something more than black students being admit-
  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 82. 
 243. Id. 
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ted to previously all-white schools, his boss announces, “The coffee break is 
over.”244 
III.  THE LIMITS OF DIRECT ACTION 
Ultimately, Simple believes that the law can overcome generations of 
white supremacy and democratic injustice, but only through an array of 
popular efforts founded upon an ethical interpretation of the Constitution.  
Well into the 1960s, the courts struggled mightily over whether and how to 
protect mass protest through First Amendment law.245  Simple has a clear-
eyed view about the limits of mass protest.  As momentum builds for civil 
rights laws and desegregation efforts, Simple begins to reflect some of the 
fatigue emerging in the community over civil rights.  After protests and 
counter-violence “has been on the front pages of the newspapers for ten 
years,” Simple observes that “some folks is getting so wrapped up in this 
integration thing, white and colored, that I do believe some of them is going 
stone cold crazy.”246  He paints an absurd picture of New Yorkers “talking 
to themselves on busses and in the subways, whirling around in the middle 
of the street, mumbling and grumbling all by themselves to nobody on park 
benches, dumping garbage on bridges . . . running out of gas on crowded 
highways on purpose.”247 
Raising things to the level of farce, he shakes his head at news of a 
white minister who lays down behind a bulldozer rolling backwards rather 
than in front of it, where the driver might see him and stop in time.  Simple 
objects to the unthinking protestor, as well as to the use of direct action as a 
knee-jerk response to every kind of social problem.248 
Worried about the unintended effects of free speech, Simple acknowl-
edges that the minister “were protesting Jim Crow—but sometimes the pro-
test is worse than the Crow.”249  Beyond the possibility that activism has 
become undirected, Simple wonders if an individual’s voice and dignity are 
lost in such mass displays.  “It is not that I might be dying in a good cause,” 
he explains, “but let me die on my own two feet, knowing where, when, and 
why, and maybe making a speech telling off the world—not in a wreck be-
  
 244. Id. 
 245. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (finding that the arrests of a group of 
peaceful African American protestors did not breach the peach when they peacefully marched near State 
House in protest of discriminatory actions against African Americans); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 
157 (1961) (finding insufficient evidence to support claim that defendants breached peace by peacefully 
sitting at a business’s whites-only lunch counter). 
 246. HUGHES, Swinging High, in SIMPLE’S UNCLE SAM, supra note 1, at 4, 6–7.  His concerns are 
magnified by a sense that “[t]he only time colored folks is front-page news is when there’s been a race 
riot or a lynching or a boycott and a whole lot of us have been butchered up or arrested.”  LANGSTON 
HUGHES, Name in Print, in SIMPLE STAKES A CLAIM, supra note 19, at 140, 140. 
 247. HUGHES, Swinging High, supra note 267, at 6–7. 
 248. Id. at 7. 
 249. Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149663
File: Tsai_Final.clean.doc Created on:  10/23/14 9:13 PM Last Printed: 10/23/14 9:14 PM 
68 Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 5 
cause somebody has stalled a car whilst traffic is speeding.  To me that is 
crazy!”250 
One day, it occurs to Simple that sit-ins and marches have lost their ef-
fectiveness through overuse.  His solution is not to abandon direct action, 
but to spice it up.  He quickly comes up with the idea of conducting “nude-
outs”: “Twenty million Negroes taking off every stitch—stepping out of 
pants, dress, and drawers in public places and posing in the nude” like Ro-
din’s The Thinker “until civil rights have come to pass.”251  After painting 
the image of a nude James Farmer, Roy Wilkins, and Constance Baker Mot-
ley as “bare as Venus” stopping traffic, he predicts that this is the only way 
“America would be forced to scrutinize our cause.”252  A nude-out would 
“shock America into clothing us in the garments of equality, not the rags of 
segregation.  And when Negroes got dressed again, we could vote in Mis-
sissippi.”253 
When Boyd warns that “the Legion of Decency would have all of you 
in jail for indecent exposure,”254  Simple humorously raises the specter of a 
Due Process violation: “The colored cops in Harlem would be naked, too, 
so how would I know, without his uniform, that he were a cop?”255  Lack of 
notice, Simple advises, will be their ticket to freedom.  He gets the particu-
lars wrong, of course, since he has not been trained as a lawyer; it is reason-
able notice of the law’s terms that Due Process requires, not actual notice 
that a police officer is watching.  Through snickers, trained lawyers will 
detect one of the risks of popular constitutionalism, namely, the possibility 
that armchair theories of the Constitution will not match judges’ interpreta-
tions.  Even so, Simple is right about one thing: through sustained interac-
tions between the people in the street and institutions, First Amendment law 
eventually embraced a broader view of mass protest.  Along the way, jurists 
overturned scores of convictions on the ground that public order laws de-
prived protestors of proper notice of the law.256  And in a development that 
would no doubt delight Simple’s creator and fans, the Supreme Court ulti-
mately recognized public nudity as protected expression.257 
The stories allow the author to work through concerns with legality and 
responsibility posed by manifest injustice.  Simple sympathizes with black 
police officers ordered to arrest black participants during the civil rights 
  
 250. Id. at 7–8. 
 251. HUGHES, supra note 1, at 107. 
 252. Id. at 108–09. 
 253. Id. at 109. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 
163 (1961).  
 257. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).  See also id. at 581 (Souter, J., con-
curring) (noting that nude performance directed at an actual or hypothetical audience should be protect-
ed); People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1013 (N.Y. City Ct. 1986) (holding that women’s topless 
protest “convey[ed] a particularized message”), upheld on other grounds, People v. Santorelli, 600 
N.E.2d 232 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that the anti-breast baring statute, which is directed only at women, 
does not apply to peaceful protest activities). 
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struggle.  How should black officers resolve their “double dilemma”—that 
they are obliged to enforce the law when their own civil rights align with 
the protestors’ actions?258  Simple rejects the narrator’s suggestion that the 
police force “should be color-blind”259 and enforce the law to quash the 
protests.  Displaying a surprising facility with moral philosophy, he points 
out, “What is and what should be is two different things.”260  Simple does 
not deny that one must stake out a defensible normative position, but he 
insists that any normative position must be heavily influenced by the social 
reality in which the law operates.  And that reality is one where police offic-
ers charged with enforcing the law routinely fulfill their obligation in a race-
conscious fashion.261 
The point is not whether to consider race or not in the abstract, since 
that is unavoidable.  Rather, the central question is what to do in a world 
where law is already profoundly shaped by racial considerations.  “So when 
a black cop sees me, he should not look through white eyes,” Simple urg-
es.262  “I am his brother—even when I am walking on a picket line and do 
not move fast enough to satisfy the police commissioner.”263  Once viewed 
in this light, it is an easy decision on the part of freedom-loving officers not 
to arrest any protestors: “When the law is not on the side of civil rights, then 
the law is not right, it’s white.”264  Thus, Simple argues that any law that has 
been perverted by ideas of racial supremacy lacks moral authority.  As such, 
protestors have a fundamental right to resist that law, and officers are ex-
cused from any obligation to enforce that law or any other law impeding a 
reunion of the moral and the legal. 
At this point, it is apparent that Simple’s ethical perspective on the Con-
stitution justifies targeted lawbreaking, though it could be taken to rational-
ize stronger forms of popular disobedience.  The author himself never goes 
there, and this notable silence distinguishes his program of legal reformation 
from projects of armed insurrection or black separatism that became in-
creasingly attractive to some of his readers.  Simple has little taste for open 
violence, and thus his tactics, like his substantive vision of the law, are 
bound by the moral-legal injunction to do no harm. 
Because he views the Constitution on ethical terms, it allows him to put 
white resisters of desegregation and black protestors on different footing.  
Defenders of white sovereignty in the streets are subverting the legal order, 
Simple believes, while civil rights activists are on the right side of higher 
law despite what ordinary laws say.  This is a distinction that a justice sys-
tem abiding by neutral principles of governance has difficulty making, but 
  
 258. HUGHES, supra note 49, at 24. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. HUGHES, supra note 53, at 169.  “You look at everything, I regret to say, in terms of black and 
white,” Boyd observes.  “’So does the Law,’ said Simple.”  Id. at 172. 
 262. HUGHES, supra note 49, at 24. 
 263. Id. 
 264. HUGHES, supra note 49, at 26. 
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Simple suggests that, on a deeper democratic level, the content of one’s 
expression matters.  A just legal system must care about more than simply 
law and order; it must be able to distinguish between love and hate, virtue 
and vice, freedom and oppression. 
IV.  CRITIQUING SIMPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 
Langston Hughes’s outlandish stories are primarily intended to subvert 
constitutional dogma and to stimulate political dialogue.  Unconstrained by 
official duties or partisan allegiances, Simple presents a working man’s the-
ory of equality, adjudication, and freedom of expression.  His irony-laced 
approach simultaneously permits and rewards a purity of thought.  But how 
well does the author’s approach satisfy other criteria for a constitutional 
theory beyond those of accessibility and coherence?  For instance, if feasi-
bility is one mark of a sound legal theory, to what extent could Simple’s 
legal theories be implemented? 
One risk involves the author’s implication that taverns are, in some 
ways, effective sites of democratic engagement.  Without coming out and 
saying so, Hughes’s portrayal implies that in such alternative fora, the peo-
ple can be more forthright, authentic, and committed.  If we can depend 
upon our better selves to engage in deliberation, the stories suggest, this can 
only improve the quality of our political and legal ideas.  Republican aims 
may be facilitated if citizens have places to which they can withdraw, con-
template the issues of the day, and formulate their own views. 
Yet the danger is that the tavern remains a private refuge rather than a 
networked political site.  If it is no more than a place for the disgruntled to 
vent, it may become a place for pooled despondency rather than a site of 
organized and effective discourse.  At that point, it loses its function as a 
republican entity.  In fairness, Simple never suggests that the tavern conver-
sations should completely replace the public ones necessary to legal reform.  
And yet the broader challenge—one never explicitly answered by the sto-
ries—is how to ensure that ideas generated at the working man’s bar of jus-
tice can actually impact the law’s development in the light of day.  Making 
effective connections between the various domains where legal knowledge 
is acquired is an elementary component of any plausible legal theory. 
What of the author’s interpretive approach to the Constitution?  
Throughout, Simple propagates an account of ethical sovereignty, that is, he 
looks upon America’s founding principles as establishing certain collective 
values and contends that the continuing legitimacy of the law depends on 
fidelity to these shared mores.  These beliefs not only animate the legal text, 
but also comprise the ties that bind citizens to one another.265  Simple is race 
  
 265. Ethical interpretations of the Constitution encompass Dworkin, who proposes an appeal to a 
shared liberal ethic, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986), to Sandel, who contends that a values-
based approach to deciding socio-legal questions is not only unavoidable but also recognizes that people 
are first and foremost constituted by their ethical communities.  MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149663
File: Tsai_Final.clean.doc Created on: 10/23/14 9:13 PM Last Printed: 10/23/14 9:14 PM 
2013] “Simple” Takes on the Supreme Court 71 
conscious, believing that neutrality is a dangerous fiction, but he never gives 
up on the possibility of reconciliation and self-rule by a heterogeneous pop-
ulation. 
Ethical theories of law are both popular and coherent.  But they can 
founder on two kinds of objections: one lodged by the pragmatist and the 
other raised by the pluralist.  Where the ethical approach treats the Constitu-
tion as a document embodying timeless values, the pragmatist understands 
the law to outline a working plan of government to solve problems.266  The 
pragmatist says that an ethical reading of the Constitution prizes ideological 
purity over realistic or empirically-driven solutions.267  Orthogonally, the 
objection of the pluralist emphasizes the force necessary to generate ethical 
change.  Large-scale ethical transformation and lock-step conformity are not 
only impossible, the pluralist claims, but also requires too much violence to 
sustain in a heterogeneous society that respects plural conceptions of the 
good life.268  At best, some thin notion of civility, neutrality, or bounded 
respect, is what constitutes the people.  This brings us full circle, as Simple 
himself challenges the liberal claim of neutrality as well as the efficacy of 
thin forms of affinity and political justice. 
Many constitutional theories incorporate some ethical component, espe-
cially when interpreting the abstract promises contained in American legal 
texts.  The differences between one theory and the next often turn on how 
single-minded one should be in pursuing an ethical reading of the Constitu-
tion and what sources should be drawn upon.  This uncertainty over the role 
of an ethically-based Constitution is reflected in Hughes’s own work.  Sim-
ple’s character is race conscious, and occasionally fantasizes about how 
black sovereignty can make the world a better place.  But he consistently 
backs away from the full ramifications of a race-centered theory of self-
governance.  A major shift in values, outlooks, and beliefs is required by 
Simple’s approach.  But hard questions linger over just how far a govern-
ment should go to reshape political beliefs, without destroying the baseline 
of respect and toleration necessary to maintain faith in a shared legal order. 
Simple’s vision of judging—one that turns to poetic justice as a means 
of implementing an ethical view of the Constitution—pushes hard against 
legal orthodoxy.  It challenges the modern view of judging as the vindica-
tion of neutral principles or the institutional values of modesty and restraint.  
Instead, he offers a view of judging as brave, forceful, and righteous.  His 
outrageous, and even farcical, efforts to reeducate whites so they can live 
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peaceably with black Americans will strike many jurists as risky, ill-
considered, and perhaps a violation of individual autonomy.  The vision of 
poetic justice works best not as a plausible approach in real cases, but rather 
as a dramatic way of providing context.  Simple’s stories portraying court-
ordered role reversal, material improvement, and atonement reveal just how 
modest the Supreme Court’s actual remedies really have been.  All the 
backlash, struggle, and noise accompanying desegregation have obscured 
the institution’s lack of ambition for democratic justice. 
The character’s defense of creative forms of street protest is not only 
plausible, but also fits comfortably with the legal vision he has sketched.  
He rightly wonders whether the politics of mass spectacle can work for any-
thing more than the most serious issues of the day.  It might even be the 
case that First Amendment law has not kept up with the needs of mass pro-
test and the strategies devised by the state to neutralize its effectiveness.  
But the distinction that Simple has drawn—where speech rights are vindi-
cated when in the right but can arguably be quelled when speakers are in the 
wrong—may make sense from a purely moral perspective but simply cannot 
be enforced fairly.  For it would invite judges to make moral judgments 
about the nature of one’s expression rather than decide whether, on some 
other principled terms, the expression is valuable and expressed in a non-
dangerous fashion.269  Who is to say, moreover, that willful violation of 
ordinary law to defend equality is ethically correct, but legal disobedience is 
wrong when accomplished in the name of protecting property rights? 
Simple’s theory of equality holds the most promise.  He is not alone in 
criticizing the Court for advancing an impoverished conception of equality, 
one that either focuses too narrowly on the appearance of progress or crum-
bles into unprincipled outcomes when pragmatic concerns are raised.  Far 
too often, the empirically complicated world of inequality in America is 
avoided by legal decisionmakers who prefer immediate, concrete, and indi-
vidualistic solutions.270  Nevertheless, his more robust theory of equality 
faces difficulties in becoming implemented.  Race-conscious remedies, 
though they may be warranted, entail social costs.  Simple intuitively recog-
nizes this, even if he does not fully explicate it.  What he seemingly recom-
mends is to move from a transitional race-based remedy into one that cen-
ters on addressing economic inequalities, without abandoning the capacity 
to perceive and address racial injustice.  Broadening the conception of equal 
protection of the law along these lines would serve not only school-age 
children, but all victims of racial discrimination.  This is as much as 
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Hughes, who struggled mightily with conflicting liberal and critical senti-
ments, could work out through literature. 
It is not a far-fetched argument, and traditional liberals and critical theo-
rists have all suggested a greater emphasis on class concerns.271  Where they 
often run into difficulties, however, concerns identifying the point at which 
explicit race-based answers are no longer necessary or worth the social 
costs, and ascertaining the kinds of economic solutions that can carry on the 
work of democratic justice. 
If Simple’s constitutional vision falters as a comprehensive legal alter-
native, it nevertheless does wonders as a mechanism for uncovering gaps in 
dominant theories and combating democratic heartbreak.  For those denied 
justice in this world, the most pressing problems can be a sense of disloca-
tion, a loss of faith in political institutions and even in the rule of law itself.  
Seen as a crucial element in the project of democratic recovery, Langston 
Hughes’s stories shine.  In the end, the author’s belief in a higher law—the 
Golden Rule, the Constitution’s promises of liberty, equality, and happi-
ness—permit him to criticize without destroying.  His writings create an 
imagined space for tending to one’s political wounds while holding out the 
promise of recommitment.  And yet, there can be so much disappointment 
and degradation to be endured.  In such a gritty world, wit is a weapon, and 
ironic detachment is a survival tactic.  They also serve as instruments of 
empowerment.  In the right hands, a politics of irony can lay bare the very 
foundations of democratic injustice.  Simple’s stories suggest that laughter, 
more than tears, may keep alive hope for legal transformation. 
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